How The Failure Of Cyber Security Cost Harris the Election

Many do not realize this, but Donald Trump largely won the election because of cyber security failings by the current administration. Don’t believe me? Cyber security losses are a huge factor in inflation and have caused a massive economic problem, which has decimated healthcare and cost billions to government agencies, all while financing Hamas and the war in Ukraine.

These macroscopic problems may not seem to be linked to cyber security losses, but they are. While politicians like to pretend it is a minor, specialized issue, the fact is that cyber losses are now decimating business and hurting the monetary supply. They are a huge factor in why American businesses are failing and why it is harder than ever to compete. The pain that Americans feel at the gas pump, when they get their pay check, pay for insurance and the problems in the world are not 100% caused by poor management of cyber risks, but that is part of it.

The biggest problem, as I have stated before, is that we simply cannot improve things until the insurance sector cleans up its act. The moral crisis we now are seeing is caused primarily by the insurance sector, which has made the decision that it is fine to lose money on cyber security and it’s fine to raise rates. They’ve created a monster, and that monster can’t be kept at bay until regulators wise up and recognize that insurance must be held accountable for the disgusting and despicable conduct of cyber security underwriters.

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Why is Ransom Paid? Panic, Perverse Incentives and Bluffs. 

It is rarely in the best interest of the victim to pay ransom! Although the narrative often is “Because they have no choice” or “It is to protect people from the leak.” This is a complete myth, and it tends to be advanced by those who have paid ransom before, as a way of covering their terrible and avoidable behavior. Nobody owns this untrue narrative more than the insurance underwriters who normalized this behavior.

The problem with something like ransomware is that most companies are willing to pay ransom, and as long as this remains true it will be a persistent problem and only get worse.  Ransomware has become so entrenched and is so easy and cheap to pull off, it will not subside until it becomes substantially difficult to succeed in a ransomware attack and make money doing so.  Unfortunately, there have been no efforts to reduce ransom payments.

It is important to never forget exactly what is paid for, with money American companies pay
(Source)

When ransomware gangs lock down a system, they are frequently the first people the victims hear from and they will do their best to instill fear, create panic and make the situation seem much worse than it is.  They will often claim that they will soon delete the data or raise their price for restoration.  Paying for data restoration is never necessary, if even the most basic of precautions have been taken to back up data, but that is often not the cast and 80% of organizations facing ransomware do not have adequate backups.   The situation is common, though always avoidable, and at least half of ransom payments are motivated primarily by the need to release systems and have data returned, not to avoid it leaking.

In many cases, companies have felt it was more reliable or faster to pay ransom, and with gangs so skilled at instilling fear and manipulating American companies, it is not uncommon.  In some cases insurers have even insisted that victims pay ransom against their will.  HSB is one of the few that still does this, forcing victims to pay ransom even if they felt it was not necessary, simply because the insurance company felt it was cheaper or safer to do so. However, the practice has never gone away completely from most insurers. Because the claims staff frequently receive kickbacks, they will tell organizations they are best off paying, even when they are not.

Unfortunately, it is not cheaper or safer to do so, and this is especially true if you do have backed up data.  The restored data is 100% assured to be contaminated with malware and backdoors and the incident response will be far worse off. Paying ransom almost doubles the average cost of cleaning up an incident in the end.  It also dramatically increases the chances of future attacks.

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An Underwriters’ Guide to Cyber Risk: Managing 3rd Party Risk – Part 2

Understanding and Preventing Zero Day And Other Software Supply Chain Attacks

This is the second post in the series, intended to help better understand how third party risks can be managed, and addressing the problem of misinformation from high raking sources. Because of the pervasiveness of the myth that third party risks are unmanageable, primarily due to the insistence by insurance executives that “Well I don’t understand it, and therefore it can’t be done.” But because of this toxic insistence, it is necessary to break things down and provide detailed supporting information.

In this post, we will look at zero days and unpatched vulnerabilities as a type of exposure to third party risk. Zero days are similar to supply chain attacks, and many of the same methods for controlling zero days apply to supply chain attacks as well. MOVEit is an example of a zero day attack, which caused massive damage to the US and global economy. It illustrates exactly how these attacks work.

In some ways, it was the kind of systemic attack that insurers are constantly complaining about. However, it also illustrates all the ways the damage could have been prevented. MOVEit was bad, but it was also tragic, because so much of the loss could have been prevented, if we had our act together on this.

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Cyber Insurance Applications Revealed

The moral failing of insurance that pays ransom regularly, makes no attempt not to, affirmatively disengages leaders and funds terrorism should be obvious, but many argue with me, stating that insurers are doing the best they can, have incomplete data, or that they are improving.

Unfortunately, they’re not. There have been a few small measures taken, mostly just in terms of wording changes. Not a dime has been invested in enforcement or compliance management.

To show how negligent these insurance companies have been, it’s important to take a look at the applications they have for cyber insurance. These applications represent all that these companies have, in terms of policy controls. It’s abundantly clear that no adult with any idea how any of this works wrote these. There is never any other enforcement. Even large clients do not receive independent assessments or audits. These “requirements” are not generally enforceable, do not create a call to action and, just plain won’t ever work. Money will continue to be lost until even the most minimal efforts to do otherwise are made.

Cyber insurance is considered a loss center (for some reason) and for this reason it gets zero investment and the underwriters who end up on this line are typically the lowest achievers. That’s truly the opposite of what is needed here.

These applications seem to be current, although some have not been updated in years. I do not think it is at all unreasonable to say that those who were responsible for writing the loss controls, for an insurance that paid extortion, to foreign hostile parties, should face some kind of criminal charges. This is not normal. This is not okay. It should not be normalized to have such clueless people, when professionals are avaliable.

Check out this PDF to get an idea of just how bad this situation is.

BREAKDOWN OF CYBER INSURANCE APPLICATIONS

HSB Total Cyber Insurance Application
AIG’S CYBER UNDERWRITING APPLICATION
Travelers CyberRisk Applications and Forms
Chubb Cyber And Privacy Insurance
Beazley Cyber Application
The Hartford CyberChoice Premier Application
FailSafe Cyber / Information Risk Supplement Application